The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices. An outstanding conjecture (e.g. Peters and Severinov (1997) ) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper: we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. Under further conditions there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, if the ratio of buyers to sellers increases, then the equilibrium reserve price increases, and the reserve price is decreasing in the size of the market. Convergence of reserve prices occur at the fast rate of 1 if the ratio of buyers to sellers is held constant.
Introduction
In many markets sellers compete by posting not simply prices, but more complicated market mechanisms. A prime example is online auction sites where many different sellers are selling similar objects, and thus they are in direct competition. When sellers post auctions the choice variable is the reserve price: a seller could try to attract more buyers by lowering his reserve price or can try his luck by posting a high reserve price hoping that buyers will come. A natural question is how the equilibrium reserve prices depend on the market size, the buyer to seller ratio and other market characteristics. Among others, McAfee (1993), Peters and Severinov (1997) and Burguet and Sakovics (1999) study sellers who compete by posting second price auctions setting the reserve price as they wish, and the buyers decide which seller to visit given the reserve prices posted. 1 Peters and Severinov (1997) consider the case where the market is infinitely large and show that in equilibrium the sellers post reserve prices that are equal to their production costs. They also show that if there is an equilibrium for each finite market size where the sellers post identical (and deterministic) reserve prices, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to the cost of production, which is normalized to zero. However, as Burguet and Sakovics (1999) argue, such an equilibrium does not exist in the case when there are two sellers and we extend their argument to the case of any (finite) number of sellers. Therefore, the equilibrium reserve price in large but finite markets is not settled by those articles. Hernando -Veciana (2005) shows that if only a finite number of reserve prices are allowed, then the equilibrium reserve price in large but finite markets converges to the cost of the sellers. While this result is interesting, it is dependent on the restriction on the set of admissible reserve prices.
Our paper revisits the question of convergence by providing two results. First, we show that in all equilibria the reserve price each seller posts converges to 0 in distribution (and in support) as the market becomes large. The logic is that as the market becomes large each seller loses his effect on the utility levels of the buyers and thus has limited incentives to increase his reserve price. On the other hand, by decreasing the reserve price a seller is able to attract extra visitors. Since the utility effect is small in large markets, the seller has to just provide a market utility to the buyers visiting him and can capture the surplus, which is generated beyond that utility level. This extra surplus stays positive, since each seller has finitely many expected visitors regardless of the market size, and thus an extra visitor increases the probability of sale increasing the surplus generated by the seller. As a consequence, decreasing the reserve price offers benefits at little costs to the seller as the market becomes large.
To confirm this conjecture, we need to show that as the market becomes large each seller loses his effect on the utility levels of the buyers. We consider a game with finitely many players and use properties of the binomial distribution to derive the desired result. 2 In our proof, we concentrate on the highest reserve price in the support of the equilibrium and show that the seller who posted that price has an incentive to reduce his reserve price regardless of what reserve price the other sellers posted, if the market is large enough. By focusing on the upper end of the support, we can characterize revenues in a simple formula, utilizing the fact that the seller posting the highest price is only visited by the buyers with the highest valuations. To do this, we first characterize the utility of a buyer type who does not visit the seller who posted the highest reserve price and thus his utility changes only because the change in the highest reserve price changes the visiting probabilities of the other buyers. The change of utility resulting from such a change in visiting probabilities is relatively easy to characterize by appealing to the envelope theorem. We then calculate the utility of buyer types who do visit the seller with the highest reservation price, by using the envelope theorem and the utility of a type who does not visit this seller. This indirect method establishes that the utility effect vanishes in large markets leading to the convergence result.
Our second result concerns cases in which a pure strategy equilibrium exist, i.e. where the sellers post non-random reserve prices, which is a deviation from the previous literature that makes assumptions that preclude the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. More precisely, the above articles assume that the lowest possible valuation of the buyers is equal to the production cost (which is normalized to zero in this paper). Then the first order condition for seller optimality suggests that the sellers choose a zero reserve price, but then it is costless to increase the reserve price, since only buyers with the lowest possible valuations (which is zero) are lost. So the second order condition fails and a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist as it was recognized by Burguet and Sakovics (1999) for the case of two sellers. Therefore, we consider the "gap case" where the lowest possible valuation is positive   0 and we provide a sufficient condition for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist. We provide intuitive comparative statics results and also characterize the rate of convergence of the reserve price to zero. If the number of buyers (sellers) increases, then the equilibrium reserve price increases (decreases), and the reserve price decreases in the size of the market. The equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 at the quick rate of 1  , if the ratio of sellers to buyers is constant. Moreover, we show that as long as the number of sellers squared over the number of buyers tends to infinity as the market becomes large, the equilibrium reserve price must converge to zero. This finding highlights that one needs much weaker conditions for convergence to occur than was stipulated before.
Model and Analysis
There are  sellers each with one unit of an indivisible good, and  risk neutral buyers each with a unit demand for the good. The valuation of each buyer is his private information, and the valuations are distributed i.i.d. according to cdf  and density  with support [  + 1]. For simplicity, assume that  is continuous, bounded and strictly positive on the support. The timing of the game is simple. First, the  sellers each post a non-negative reserve price   and then each buyer decides which seller to visit 2 Our approach is different from that of Hernando-Veciana (2005) who approximates large finite markets with the limiting case of infinitely many agents. As a consequence, he works with the more tractable limiting distribution, instead of the binomial distribution that arises in games with finitely many players. Since his game only has finitely many strategies (reserve prices) this approximation works well, but in our game with a continuous action space the same approximation does not directly deliver the desired convergence result. Our different approach is also useful to obtain closed form solutions for exact equilibria. This is essential when in Section 3 we analyze pure strategy equilibria to understand under what conditions convergence occurs and at what rate.
after observing all the reserve prices posted. At seller  the buyers present engage in a second price auction with reserve price   . 3 The winner of the auction is the buyer with the highest bid, in case of tie the seller flips a fair coin. The payment of the winner is equal to the reserve price if no other buyer visited seller  and the highest other bid if there was a competing bid, while losing bidders do not pay. Each seller maximizes his expected revenue. Each buyer  obtains a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (surplus) equal to his valuation   minus his payment   if he wins the auction, and zero otherwise. Finally, buyers maximize their expected utility.
We now turn to the analysis starting with the buyer's stage game taking the reserve prices set by the sellers ( 1   2     ) as given. Given that the sellers post second price auctions, it is a dominant strategy for each buyer to submit a bid equal to his valuation at the auction where he participates. Assuming that each buyer follows his dominant strategy when bidding, the only decision a buyer needs to make is which seller to visit. We concentrate on equilibria where the buyers employ symmetric visiting strategies. Formally, the probability that buyer  with type  visits seller  when the reserve prices posted by the  sellers are (
. This requirement means that the visiting decision of a buyer only depends on his valuation for the object, but not on the name of the buyer. This requirement is standard in the competing mechanisms literature, and captures the notion that in large markets buyers are unable to coordinate their actions and behave in an anonymous manner.
Let us start the analysis by characterizing the equilibrium visiting strategies of the buyers given the reserve prices posted by the sellers. Lemma 1 exploits a simple single crossing property: a buyer with lower valuation is less eager to obtain the good and thus he is willing to pay less. Therefore, buyers with lower valuations are more likely to visit sellers who posted lower reserve prices as in two-seller analysis of Burguet and Sakovics (1999) :
Then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the buyers' stage game. This equilibrium is characterized by cutoff strategies: there exist (unique) cutoff types (
and buyer types between   and  +1 visit the first  + 1 sellers each with probability 1 +1 , while types less than  0 do not visit any seller.
Proof. See the Appendix.
While very high types (above  −1 ) randomize between all  sellers, lower types restrict their visits to sellers who posted lower reserve prices. Very low types (types lower than  1 ) only visit the seller with the lowest reserve price. The existence of such cutoff types can be established following the two seller analysis provided by Burguet and Sakovics (1999) . We establish the uniqueness of the cutoff types by making use of the incentive conditions of the buyers in an iterative procedure.
Let us characterize the equilibrium utility of the buyers in their stage game when the reserve prices posted are already fixed at ( 1   2     ). Since all buyers follow symmetric strategies by assumption, the equilibrium utility of a buyer depends only on his valuation, but not on his name. Also, as the lemma above claims there is a unique equilibrium in the buyers' stage game and thus the equilibrium utility of the buyers is uniquely determined. Therefore, let (  1   2     ) denote the equilibrium (expected) utility of a buyer with type  ∈ [  + 1] in the buyer's stage game given the posted reserve prices. For brevity, we will simply refer to this utility as () when this does not create any confusion.
The result that the (symmetric) equilibrium of the buyers stage game is unique has important implications also for continuity properties. As we show it in the proof of the above lemma the cutoff types ( 0   1    −1    ) are solutions to a system of equations that are polynomial in the reserve prices. Therefore, the correspondence that describes the equilibrium cutoff values for any reserve price vector is upper-hemicontinuous. The above lemma implies that the correspondence is also single-valued and thus the cutoff types are continuous in the reserve prices.
We now show that the equilibrium (expected) revenue functions are continuous in the cutoff types and reserve prices. For simplicity let us consider a small deviation of seller  such that for all  6 =  it holds that   6 =   . 4 To calculate the revenue of seller  it is necessary and sufficient to know the second highest type visiting if there are at least two visitors, or otherwise one needs to know whether a visit occurred at all. Using Lemma 1, the probability that any given buyer visits seller , the seller with the th lowest reserve prices can be written as
Let   denote the distribution function of the type of a buyer conditional on visiting seller . Using
Bayes rule, for all  ≥  −1 it holds that
and then using this procedure one can calculate   for all  ≥  −1 . By construction,   ( −1 ) = 0, since types lower than  −1 do not visit seller . Let f   denote the distribution function of the second order statistics of buyer types visiting, setting it zero if less than two buyers visited. Then for all
To explain this formula, note that the probability that no buyer visits is (1 −   )  , and the probability that one buyer visits is   (1 −   ) −1 . In both cases the second order statistics is set to zero. If there are  ≥ 2 buyers visiting, then the probability that the second highest type is less than  is given in the brackets above. Let e   () denote the derivative of f   at . Using the above calculations, one can write seller 's expected revenue for any small deviation that still leaves him the seller with the th lowest reserve:
This revenue formula is a simple consequence of the second-price auction format. If no buyer visits the revenue is zero, if one visits then it is   , and if several do then the revenue is equal to the second highest bid (which is equal to the second highest type). Inspecting formula (2), it is clear that the expected revenue is continuous in the reserve prices and cutoff types, because functions   and e   () do not depend directly on the reserve prices and depend continuously on the cutpoints. We have already argued that cutoff types are unique and continuous in reserves. Let us then take the game between the seller, taking as given that the buyers play the unique symmetric equilibrium in their stage game. This defines revenue functions for the sellers only in terms of reserve prices, once one substitutes in the cutoff types in the revenue formula. Given our continuity results, one can conclude that the revenues in this game are continuous in the decision variables, the reserve prices. The following lemma summarizes this discussion:
Lemma 2 The expected revenue of seller  is continuous in the reserve prices posted.
Also, each seller posts a reserve price   in the compact, convex set [0  + 1]. Therefore, standard existence results (appealing to Glicksberg's fixed-point Theorem) imply that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the sellers' game, 5 and thus our entire game has an equilibrium where the buyers follow symmetric strategies. The following Corollary recaps our discussion:
Corollary 1 There exists a Perfect-Bayesian equilibrium where the buyers follow symmetric strategies.
Before proceeding to our main result, it is useful to further characterize how the cutoff types respond to changes in the reserve prices. The result below establishes that the cutoffs are continuously differentiable in the reserve prices as long as all reserve prices are different:
Lemma 3 If no two reserve prices are equal, then at point ( 1   2     ) the cutoff types and the expected revenues are continuously differentiable functions of the reserve prices. Moreover, if   6 =   for all  6 = , then at that point the cutoff types and expected revenues are continuously differentiable functions of   and the partial derivative with respect to   is also continuous in   for all  6 = . If   =   for some  6 = , then right hand partial derivatives and left hand partial derivatives of the cutoff types and expected revenues with respect to   still exist.
Proof. See the Appendix, together with Lemmas 1 and 4.
To prove this result we first note that any cutoff type   is indifferent between visiting seller  − 1 and . This gives us  − 1 indifference conditions in  − 1 unknowns, the cutoff values. We are able to exploit the special structure of these conditions to show that one can use the implicit function theorem to obtain the desired conclusion. The logic of the exercise does not allow to handle the case where the reserve prices are not all different, since in this case slightly increasing or slightly decreasing the reserve price would change a seller's ranking, and then the whole set of equations would need to be rewritten to reflect this change in the ranking. Indeed, one can show that differentiability fails at a point ( 1   2     ) where   =   for  6 = , but left hand and right hand derivatives with respect to all reserve prices exist. It is also useful to point out that given the nature of the problem, the utility function of the buyers  also satisfies similar differentiability properties.
With these results in hand we are ready to consider our main question, that is whether the equilibria of games with a finite number of players converge (as the market size becomes large) to the equilibrium of the infinite game where all sellers post a zero reserve price. We prove that such a convergence result indeed holds. The proof follows our intuitive argument in the Introduction. We first show that as the market grows large, each seller loses his effect on the equilibrium utilities of the buyers. Then we conclude the proof by showing that serving an extra type has a non-vanishing positive effect on total welfare, which is thus captured by the seller as revenue in the limit. Proof. Take a sequence of games characterized by the number of sellers   and the number of buyers   and assume that      → ∞ as  → ∞. Denote the upper end of the support of the equilibrium strategies of seller  as    and denote the distribution function of the equilibrium reserve prices 6 by    . Note, that it is without loss of generality to assume that it is a best response to post reserve price    , because the game between the sellers is continuous in the reserve prices. In the main text we provide the proof only for a simpler case (Case 1), relegating the more complicated case (Case 2) to the Appendix.
Case 1: First, assume that the equilibrium reserve price distribution does not put positive probability on    , i.e. for all  and  it holds that lim
The proof is presented in steps. In
Step 1, we show that it is sufficient to establish that the seller with the highest strictly positive reserve price would always want to decrease his reserve if the market is large enough. In Step 2 we introduce a useful lemma and reformulate our problem. In Step 3 we provide an upper bound to the sensitivity of buyer utilities to a slight change in the action of the seller with the highest reserve price. In Step 4, we show that if the market is large enough, then it is profitable for the seller with the highest reserve to decrease his reserve price, which concludes the proof.
Step 1:
For our purposes it is sufficient to show that lim The rest of Step 1 formalizes the italicized statement above and shows that this statement is sufficient to conclude that lim
denote the distribution function of the equilibrium reserve prices posted by the other sellers,
is well defined for any market size  by the uniqueness claim of Lemma 1. Let
Fixing the market size  and the strategies of the other sellers, the derivative of the expected revenue of seller  can be written as R
To formalize the italicized statement, suppose that for all
Then it follows that if  = () and
holds then it is profitable for seller () to decrease his reserve price from   . Since this statement is true for any    0, therefore lim Step 2: The rest of the proof (Steps 2-4) finds an appropriate threshold value e  for any value of   such that (3) holds under the conditions stated before (3) . For the rest of the proof assume without loss of generality that
Moreover, we will not indicate superscript  if its omission does not create any confusion. By Lemma 3,   is continuously differentiable with respect to   in this case. The following useful lemma helps our analysis:
The above lemma implies that one can take  −1 as the decision variable of seller , since  −1 is one-to-one with   if one fixes  − . Letting
given Lemma 4, inequality (3) is equivalent to inequality
However, it is more useful to establish the stronger condition that for some negative  it holds that
The main advantage of establishing the stronger condition (4), is that under (4) it is sufficient to cover the simplest case where
where the two largest reserve prices are posted by a single seller. To see this, note that by Lemma 3 the expected revenue and the cutoffs are continuously differentiable in  −2 and thus
, it must be still true that
The rest of the proof (Steps 3 and 4) establishes that for all (4) holds, which is sufficient to establish the desired conclusion by the above discussion.
Step 3: In this step we characterize the change in utilities of the buyers who visit seller  = (), if seller  reduces  −1 slightly by reducing his reserve price slightly from   . Using the incentive conditions of the buyers one can establish that for all    −1 it holds that
The formula (5) is the key step in the argument, as it implies that the utility effect of a single seller vanishes in large markets. Formula (5) is formally proven as Lemma 5 in the Appendix, but given its significance the rest of Step 3 goes through the main steps of the argument in an informal manner. The formal proof is somewhat involved as it involves function (), for which there is no simple explicit formula. To tackle the difficulties, we follow an indirect method. Instead of directly characterizing the utility changes of types who visit seller  (i.e. types above  −1 ), we characterize the changes in the utility of those types who visit seller  − 1 but not seller , i.e. types between  −2 and  −1 . This indirect method has the advantage that one does not need to calculate how sensitive the cutoff types to a change in   are, a calculation which would involve a complicated system of equations in  − 1 variables. For types on interval [ −2   −1 ] who visit seller  − 1 the relevant reserve price  −1 is unchanged, and thus their utility changes only because of changes in  −1 and  −2 . Moreover, for types close to (and above)  −2 the change in utility occurs only in the case where there is no other buyer visiting seller  − 1. (Otherwise, the utility is close to zero anyway, since the second highest type visiting seller  − 1 is greater than  −2 , and thus a type close to  −2 who pays an amount of at least  −2 obtains a utility level very close to zero.) The utility of a buyer with valuation  for the case when no other buyer visits seller  − 1 can be written as the probability that no other buyer visits seller  − 1 times his surplus  −  −1 in this case. Formally, the utility in this case is
The derivative of this expression with respect to  −1 depends on how  −2 responds to a change in  −1 . Fortunately, our analysis only uses the fact that
≥ 0 which holds by Lemma 4. 8 Substituting
yields an upper bound to how big the utility effect can be for a type , which is close to  −2 . 9 Then one can use the envelope theorem to estimate the utility changes for all the types who visit seller , i.e. types greater than  −1 . The details are in the Appendix.
Step 4: The rest of the proof formalizes the key intuition of the proof, i.e. we formally show that the benefit from increasing participation remains positive, while the utility costs tend to zero and therefore it is beneficial for the seller with the highest reserve price to decrease his reserve. We first calculate the expected revenue of seller  as the total surplus generated at seller  minus the total utilities of the types visiting seller . For all  ≥  −1 let () denote the probability that seller  sells to a buyer with type less than  or does not sell at all. This event happens if and only if no buyer with type greater than  visits seller  and thus ()
 , the total surplus generated at  is
()
Since such types visit seller  with probability 1 it follows that the sum of utilities generated at  can be written as
Then the expected revenue is   =   −   and one can assume that seller  maximizes e   with respect to  −1 . It holds that
Since type  −1 wins with probability
and thus
8 Note, that by the chain rule and Lemma 4
Using (5) and (7), one obtains from (6) that
Therefore, for all    0, if  is large enough such that (8) holds, and (4) holds, which concludes the proof for Case 1 as we indicated it in Step 2. Case 2: Now, assume that the equilibrium bid distribution may put positive probability on    , i.e. it does not hold that lim
The formal proof for this case is given in the Appendix. The idea behind the proof is the same as in Case 1: the utility effect of any seller vanishes in the limit. Then each seller maximizes the total surplus created at his store, which is achieved by selling the object if any buyer visits at all. The main technical complications compared to Case 1 are twofold. First, when a seller with the highest reserve considers a deviation downwards, he will not be the seller with the highest reserve price any more, if other sellers posted the exact same reserve price that he did before the deviation. Therefore, the deviating seller's profit can be described in a more complicated manner that depends on the last two cutpoints, and not only the last one. One then needs to calculate how both of those cutpoints respond to a change in the reserve price, which complicates the analysis substantially. The second, and more major complication is that now the number of sellers  who posted the very highest reserve price (in a "tie") can take any numbers between 1 and , where  becomes large as the market becomes large. We need to distinguish different cases depending on whether  is large or small compared to  as the market grows large, and need to show that a uniform bound (that is now independent of not only the reserve prices posted by the other seller, but also of ) exists. Using the above argument one can also show that the rate of convergence is fairly quick under our assumptions. Inspecting formula (8) that is valid in case 1, suggests that the upper end of the equilibrium reserve price distribution  satisfies if     for some constant . The proof for Case 2 in the Appendix shows that his result holds there as well. Therefore, the posted reserve prices must converge to zero in distribution at the fast rate of 1 under our assumption that  ≤  for all markets .
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It is appropriate here to compare our results with that of Hernando-Veciana (2005) who considers a convergence result as well. The main difference is that he assumes that the sellers are restricted to a finite grid that includes production costs. This assumption leads to a pure strategy equilibrium for a large enough (but finite!) market size where all sellers post a reserve price equal to their production 10 If one lifts this assumption, then it is our conjecture that convergence would also hold (at a rate possibly slower than 1) under the weaker condition that lim
= 0, but a proof is currently unavailable. We will see it in the next Section that this condition is sufficient in the case when a pure strategy equilibrium exists.
costs. The discrete grid also allows him to consider the case where sellers have heterogeneous production costs, a case which is not formally studied here.
11 A further major difference between Hernando-Veciana (2005) and our paper is that when the market becomes large he assumes that the ratios of buyers to sellers are fixed, while we allow it to change as long as in the limit the ratio of buyers to sellers remains bounded. Finally, we are able to study a pure strategy equilibrium for finite markets (see Section 3), which was not possible by using the large market approximations of Hernando-Veciana (2005). In particular, we give sufficient conditions for when such an equilibrium exists, and if it does what is the speed of convergence, and we also show interesting comparative statics results.
Symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
In this Section we study whether an equilibrium exist for a given     where sellers use pure strategies, and characterize such an equilibrium if it exists providing comparative statics and convergence results. Burguet and Sakovics (1999) established that when  = 0 and there are  = 2 sellers, such a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. For reasons of tractability, we concentrate on symmetric pure strategy equilibria where the sellers play symmetric and pure strategies all posting reserve price  ≥ 0.
(The buyers are assumed to use symmetric strategies as before.) In what follows we assume that  ≤  in equilibrium and thus all types are served. 12 The following result characterizes such an equilibrium when it exists and provides a necessary second order condition for existence:
Theorem 2 There is at most one symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the game. In the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium each seller posts a reserve price
A necessary condition for such an equilibrium to exist is that
Proof. Suppose that all other sellers post reserve price  and seller 1 deviates to  1 . 13 First, take the case where  1  . By Lemma 1, the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the buyers' stage game is such that types less than  visit sellers 2 through  with equal probability and types above  visit all  sellers with equal probability. By Lemma 4  and  1 are one-to-one, so the deviating seller's problem could be written using decision variable  instead of  1 .
Next, note that type  has the same probability of winning at any seller, this probability is (1 −
1− () 
). At seller 1 type  wins if and only if all the other buyers visited other sellers and his payment is  1 conditional on winning. Therefore, the expected payment of type  at seller 1 is
, then the expected payment is the expected value of the highest type among the  buyers conditional on they all having types less than  (otherwise buyer  does not win). Let  () denote this expected value when  other buyers visited.
11 While a formal analysis of the heterogeneous cost case is beyond the scope of this work, the logic behind Theorem 1 extends to this case to some extent. More precisely, our proof can be directly adapted to show that the seller with the highest cost (also the one with the highest reserve price) must post a reserve price that converges to his cost of production as the market becomes large. However, a convergence result for sellers with lower cost levels does not follow directly.
12 One can show that there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium where this condition fails. Moreover, our conjecture is that a pure strategy equilibrium with asymmetric reserve prices does not exist, but a proof is unavailable. 13 The calculations below could be obtained as a special case of our first two numbered formulas. However, we find it more instructive to simplify the analysis by using that all other sellers post the same reserve price, and derive the revenue formula from "scratch".
Since his probability of winning is the same whether he visited seller 1 or  6 = 1, the payment of type  must be equal at seller 1 and at the other sellers. Therefore,
as an expected value of a random variable. Let  take value zero when there is no other buyer at seller  6 = 1, and otherwise let  take the highest type among the other buyers who visited . Let function () be equal to  if  ≤  and let () = 0 if   . Then  is the expected value of random variable ( ). Letting  be the density function of  , it holds that
Now, we describe the expected revenue of seller 1. The revenue of seller 1 is equal to  1 if exactly one buyer visited him, and zero if no buyer did. If more than two buyers visited him, then the revenue is equal to the value of the second highest type. Therefore, the expected revenue from having  ≥ 2 buyers visiting is equal to  () , the expected value of the second highest type conditional on all buyers having types above  (otherwise they would have visited other sellers). With this shorthand notation the expected revenue of seller 1 is
A similar reasoning as before formula (11) yields that
Equations (10), (11), (12) and (13) yield that
Now, let  1  . In this case the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the buyers' stage game is such that types less than  visit seller 1 and types above  visit all  sellers with equal probability. For all  ≤  let
and for all    let
A similar analysis as above yields that inducing  ∈ [  + 1] yields an expected revenue of
The first order condition at  =  is The above result adds a few important insights that were not possible to draw when a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. First, Theorem 2 implies that as the number of sellers (buyers) increases the sellers post lower (higher) equilibrium reserve prices to compete effectively. This result is very intuitive as it shows that market forces work in the intuitive directions. Second, the Theorem also shows that the equilibrium reserve price decreases in the size of the market due to the fact that each seller has less effect on the equilibrium utility levels of the buyers and thus increasing his reserve price becomes less appealing for each seller. To see how the market size effect works, let −1 −1 =  fixed and note that the candidate equilibrium has a reserve price
which is decreasing in market size. Third, one is able to obtain a rate of convergence that turns out to be quite fast. To see this, assume again that −1 −1 =  is held fixed, and note that in this case the reserve price posted converges to zero at rate 1. Fourth, one is able to relax the assumption of Hernando-Veciana (2005) that the ratio of buyers to sellers is constant. More precisely, the above Theorem shows that if lim −1 (−1) 2 = 0, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to zero, even if the ratio of buyers to sellers () converges to infinity. However, if the ratio of buyers to sellers converges to infinite fast enough, then convergence does not occur, since the sellers try to take advantage of the large number of buyers by posting high reserve prices. Fifth, it may be interesting to see how the results change when the sellers are known to have lower valuations than the buyers, a case that was mostly neglected by the previous literature. Sixth, our result also shows that if a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, then it only depends on the number of buyers and sellers, and the lowest possible valuation of the buyers, but not on the distribution of valuations.
14 Finally, it is interesting to point it out that as the market becomes large it holds that  * → 0, and thus for any (fixed) positive values of  and  (), the local second order condition  () ≥  * is satisfied in the limit. This suggests that as the market becomes large, it is more likely that there is a pure strategy equilibrium. According to our conjecture (see below), for any convex distribution function  and   0 (the gap case), there exists a pure strategy equilibrium if the market is large enough.
The above results (except for the last) are, of course, conditional on having a pure strategy equilibrium at all. It is important to understand when such an equilibrium exists and when it does not. Our starting point is that (as Burguet and Sakovics (1999) have already it pointed out) the first order conditions are not sufficient for seller optimization, and this is the cause for non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium when  = 0. Indeed, when  = 0 (the case studied by Burguet and Sakovics (1999)), the local second order condition fails and a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. In our model with  large enough, this problem does not arise, because with a high enough level of  it holds that
In less technical terms, the key is to study the incentives to increase the reserve price slightly from when all the other sellers posted . As a seller changes his reserve price from , the change in the cutoff type  1 depends only on  (), but not the entire distribution of types  . Therefore, the revenue of the deviator may depend only on  (), but not on function  . It turns out that  () cancels out in the first order condition as a balance of two effects. On one hand, the higher  () is the more costly it is to lose visits from types less than  1 for any fixed value of  1 . On the other hand, the higher  () is the less the cutoff  1 is influenced by the reserve price. These two effects are equally important, and thus  () does not have a first order effect on how the revenue changes when  1 changes. But the density  () does not cancel out in the second order condition. Moreover, the more buyers have types close to  (i.e. the higher  () is), the more costly it is to lose visits from types close to , and therefore the more likely that increasing ones reserve price is not profitable. This intuition is confirmed formally in the above proof.
The following Corollary provides a sufficient condition for existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium and states a specific case in which those conditions hold: Proof. The first part of the Theorem is a simple consequence of the above analysis. For the  = 2 case a simple substitution yields that Unfortunately, a simple condition stated on the primitives is not available when   2. However, based on extensive numerical calculations we conjecture that convexity of  is sufficient for any   for a pure strategy equilibrium to exists as long as the local second order condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied. 15 More precisely, using Mathematica we were not able to find any cases with  convex where the global sufficient conditions ( 1 and b  1 being quasiconcave) fail. Since functions  1 and b  1 are highly complicated polynomial functions involving high order powers of  and , an analytical proof to support our conjecture remains unavailable.
Conclusion
Our contribution to the literature on competing auctions is twofold. First, we analyze the case of large markets and show that as the market becomes large, the utility effect of each single seller approaches zero. Therefore, as long as his reserve price is larger than his cost, it is strictly profitable for each seller to attract extra buyers by decreasing his reserve price. Hence in large markets, we prove that the sellers post reserve prices close to their production costs. Second, we provide conditions under which a pure strategy equilibrium exists and provide explicit solutions for the case of finite markets. This allows us to obtain intuitive comparative statics results, showing that if the number sellers (buyers) increases then the equilibrium reserve price goes down (up), and as the market size increases the equilibrium reserve price decreases.
Appendix
Proof of Lemmas 1, 3 and 4 : Proof. Proving that any equilibria can be characterized by such cutoff values as was stated in Lemma 1 is a straightforward extension of the proof for the case of two sellers as covered in Burguet and Sakovics (1999) , and is thus omitted. The other results are proved in the following order. We first prove the content of Lemma 3. The uniqueness part of Lemma 1 then follows from that proof almost immediately. At the end of the proof we cover Lemma 4.
Note, that to prove Lemma 3 we only need to prove continuous differentiability of the cutoff types with respect to the reserves, since the revenue functions are continuously differentiable in the reserve prices and the cutoff types as formula (2) in the main text implies. Let us calculate how the cutoff types are calculated given a reserve price vector ( , and thus the two winning probabilities are equal:
) −1 . Therefore, the indifference condition of type  1 implies that such a buyer type has to make the same expected payment at the two sellers. At seller  the expected payment conditional on winning is simply   , since that type pays only if no other buyer is present and the payment is equal to the reserve price. 
This equation involves only two cutoff type values,  −1 and  −2 . To see this, note that the above equation only involves the probability distribution of  1 −1 , which we denote by Γ −1 . One can then rewrite (17) as
To describe the distribution function Γ −1 , note that its support is
by construction, since all the competing buyers at seller  − 1 have types on
This distribution function depends only on  −1 and  −2 and the reserve prices, since   and  −1 are only functions of  −1 and  −2 . Therefore, equation (18) involves only those two variables. Denoting the right hand side of (18) by  −1 this equation can be rewritten as
We now proceed to show that
 0 and thus the implicit function Theorem can be used to describe  −2 as a continuously differentiable function of  −1 and also to conclude that
To establish this we show that a change in  −2 causes a first order stochastic dominant change in distribution function Γ −1 . To see this note, that
Let e  −2   −2 denote two possible values of the ( − 2) cutpoint. Then since the formula (19) does not depend on  −2 , it must hold that for all  ∈ [ e  −2   −1 ) the two distribution functions are equal:
Moreover, for all  ≥  −1 it holds that e Γ −1 () = Γ −1 () = 1. As we have already note above
Also, by strict monotonicity of Γ −1 on [ −2  e  −2 ] it follows that for all  on that interval
where the first equality follows because the right hand side of (19) does not depend on the ( − 2) cutpoint, while the second inequality follows from the fact that when the ( − 2) cutoff takes value e  −2 , then no buyer with type lower than e  −2 visits. Putting all these observations together implies that Γ −1 first order stochastically dominates e Γ −1 and thus
Moreover, it is routine to establish that  −1 is differentiable in its second component, and that its derivative is always strictly negative. Now, we show that
 0. For this it is sufficient to show that Γ −1 is decreasing in  −1 . First,
is clearly decreasing in  −1 . A similar argument shows that
is decreasing as well, which concludes this step and shows that given the reserve prices and  −1 there is a unique cutoff  −2 that is a candidate for an equilibrium in the buyers' stage game. Moreover,  −2 is a differentiable function of  −1 and
 0. Now, one can write up the indifference conditions corresponding to cutoff type  −2 . This condition involves only three endogenous variables:  −3   −2 and  −1 . To complete the inductive steps one would need to conclude that
These inequalities together with the property of the implicit function from the previous step
 0 imply that one can again use the implicit function theorem to describe  −3 as a function of  −1 and also that
The proof of the inequalities in (20) again follows after establishing stochastic dominance of the distribution of the first order statistics. The distribution of the first order statistics can be written as
It takes almost an identical argument as above to show that Γ −2 is increasing in  −3 and then first order stochastic dominance implies that indeed
 0 is done by a slight modification of the proof in the first step (for function Γ −1 ).
Iterating the above arguments, one can use  − 2 indifference conditions corresponding to cutoffs
This procedure yields that all the cutoff values  −2   −3    2   1 can be expressed as a continuously differentiable function of  −1 with
Then one can use the indifference condition corresponding to type  1 to obtain that
As before the stochastic dominance argument implies that for all  = 1 2   − 1
Substituting the implicit functions for lower cutoff types (as a function of  −1 ) one can rewrite the above equation as
Then by the above results
 0 holds and the implicit function theorem can be used to obtain a continuously differentiable function  −1 ( 1   2     ). Then using the previous function one can obtain continuously differentiable functions   ( 1   2     ) for all  = 1 2   − 2 as well. This concludes the proof of continuous differentiability for the case where all reserves are different. Now, if two reserves are equal,   =  +1 the above procedure does not guarantee that when we increase   the same derivatives apply as when we decrease it. (Indeed this is not true in general!) Therefore, at those points only right hand and left hand derivative exist.
This proof also implies that since
 0 there exists a unique solution, and thus a unique equilibrium cutoff vector exists for any vector of reserve prices. Moreover, if     −1 then if   is slightly changed then the ranking of the sellers remain unchanged, and thus continuous differentiability in   in the claim of Lemma 3 follows from the above argument. Continuity of the derivatives 
Let Ω() and e Ω() be the probability that a buyer with type  obtains the object when the reserve price is   or e   . 16 The envelope theorem implies that
and
Since by assumption  −1  e  −1 therefore for all the types    −1 it holds that
since type  loses if and only if there is a higher type visiting seller , which occurs with the same probability in the two cases. Therefore, the last four formulas imply that
Now, for the same reason as before it holds for all  ∈ ( e  −1
because the probability that another buyer with type between  and  −1 visits the same seller as type
. A simple comparison yields that e Ω()  Ω() and then (22), (23) and (24) 
Now, suppose that e  −2   −2 . Then a similar argument as above implies that for all  ∈ ( e  −2  e  −1 ) it holds that e Ω()  Ω() and thus e  0 ()   0 (). Then (25) implies that
By construction it is optimal for type e  −2 to visit seller  − 1 when seller  posts a reserve price of e   . Also, since  −1  e  −1  e  −2   −2 it follows that it is optimal for type e  −2 to visit seller  − 1 when seller  posts a reserve price of   . Let us compare ( e  −2 ) and e ( e  −2 ) directly. Since e  −2   −2 and  −1  e  −1 , it follows that seller  − 1 is visited with a strictly lower probability when  posted e   then when he posted   and simple calculations show that it must hold that ( e  −2 )  e ( e  −2 ) since the reserve price posted by seller  − 1 is unchanged. But the last inequality contradicts with (26) and thus  −2  e  −2 follows. Similar arguments as before formula (25) then imply that
Proceeding iteratively one can show that for all  it holds that for all  = 1 2   − 1
and also that for all  ()  e ().
However, take a low type  ∈ ( 1  e  1 ) who visits seller 1 both when seller  posts   or when he posts e   . It is easy to see that if the cutoff values decrease then he is better off, because seller 1 is visited with a lower probability. Therefore, (27) implies that e ()  (), which contradicts (28) establishing that
 0 can be established by a similar iterative argument, which we omit. The claim that () decreases in   for all  ≥  −2 follows also from the envelope theorem and the iterative construction employed. Given our other differentiability results it follows that () is (continuously) differentiable in   , when   is not equal to any other reserves.
Lemma 5 In case 1 it holds for all
Let Ω() denote the probability that type  is receiving an object. Since a type  ∈ ( −2   −1 ) visits seller  − 1 any of the other  − 1 buyers takes the object away from a buyer with type  if this other buyer has a type between  and  −1 and visits seller  − 1 or has a type higher than  −1 and visits seller  − 1. (In what follows we will not explicitly use the superscript , but all elements of strategic interaction    and the reserve prices depend on .) Using Lemma 1, the first possibility occurs with probability
, while the second occurs with probability
. Therefore, any given other buyer does not take the object away from a buyer with type  with probability
Therefore, considering the case where none of the other  − 1 buyers take the object away from a buyer with type  one obtains
A similar argument implies that for all    −1
which does not depend on  −1 . Let  ∈ ( −2   −1 ) and calculate the utility such a type achieves in equilibrium. The probability that no other buyer visits seller  − 1 is (
, in which case the buyer with type  pays  −1 for the object, which he wins for sure. The probability that  ∈ {1 2   − 1} other buyers visit seller  − 1 and all visitors have types less than  is
 . In this case the payment of a buyer with type  is equal to the largest valuation among all the  − 1 other buyers who visit seller  − 1. Therefore, his (expected) utility can be written as
(31) Now, take the decision problem of seller  in terms of choosing  −1 , (which we can do since  −1 and   are in a one-to-one relationship by Lemma 4) and let us calculate the utility change of a type when seller  decreases his decision variable  −1 slightly. One needs to allow all the other cutpoints to change to accommodate the change in  −1 , and thus when derivatives are taken with respect to  −1 these indirect effects are also taken into account in what follows. Fixing  at the initial value of  −2 we obtain that
The derivatives of the other terms of () at  =  −2 , except for the first one, are zero for the same reason and thus
Now, by Lemma 4, it follows that
Then revisiting (32) yields that
Using the envelope theorem we obtain that for all
Formulas (29) and (30) imply that for all    −1 it holds that
Using that (
(−1) ) −2  1 and  ≤  + 1 implies together with the above formula that indeed
If  sellers post the highest reserve price   , then if any single seller (seller ) of those  deviates in such a way  − decreases below the original value, then it holds that
and that since type +1 visits the sellers who posted the highest reserve price and that reserve price does not change when seller  decreases   slightly, therefore ( + 1) changes only because  −+1 changes. Let us show now that
is uniformly bounded. To see this, let () denote the probability that no other buyer with type above  visits seller  −  + 1, the seller that the highest type,  + 1 visits with positive probability. Then for all  ≥  −+1
Therefore, the last equation and formula (35) imply that
Let Ω() denote the probability of winning for a buyer with type . For  ≥  −+1 it holds that
Using the envelope formula,
Using formulas (36) and (37) implies that indeed
Proof for Case 2: Proof. In Case 2 the main difference is that with positive probability there may be   1 sellers who post the highest reserve prices. The proof below establishes exactly that if there are   1 sellers who post the highest reserve price, then any of those  sellers find it profitable to decrease his reserve price. First, take the case where  = , i.e. all the other sellers post reserve price   as well. As we show it in the Appendix in the proof of Theorem 2, seller  has an incentive to decrease his reserve price if
But this threshold is approaching zero and thus if the market is large enough, seller  has an incentive to decrease his price for any positive   .
Otherwise
and suppose that seller  decreases   slightly. In this case Lemma 1 implies that after this change seller  is visited with probability Because of the above lemma, instead of   one can take  − as the choice variable of seller . Take a buyer with type  that is equal to the original value of  −−1 . For that type it is optimal to visit seller  − . Suppose that  − goes down and thus  −−1 goes down as well by the Lemma 7. Then for type  it is still optimal to visit seller  − . Lemma 6 implies that we can bound the utility effect of such a change as:
We first provide a uniform convergence result for the case where  is not too small. For all  ≥  −−1 let () denote the probability that seller  sells to a buyer with type less than  or does not sell at all and let () = . It is useful to describe the utility cost in an alternative way using the function  * that describes the utility of a type conditional on obtaining the object from seller :
Note that type  − obtains the object from seller  if and only if no other buyer visited seller  and thus his utility conditional on obtaining the object is  * ( − ) =  − −   . With this formulation (and explicitly recognizing the cutpoints) one can rewrite the revenue as
Using the above definitions implies that
 ( 
On the other hand if  ≥ 2
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that . For the second order condition to hold, it is necessary and sufficient that  0 () ≤ 0, since that is equivalent to showing that  0 1 has the correct sign in a neighborhood of  = . Then we need to inspect 
